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Abstract
This paper explores the interaction between foreign-debt bailout guaran-
tees, financial supervision and optimal factor taxation. The context is that
of a pre-“twin crises” emerging market economy and the analysis is under-
taken using an original stylised two-period model based on the insights of
the “third-generation” currency crisis literature. Bailout guarantees lead to
moral hazard problems as banks monitor less and lend more than is socially
desirable. As such, the solution of the government’s Ramsey taxation prob-
lem under bailouts entails a corrective rationale for capital taxation, imply-
ing a higher tax-rate than would otherwise be the case. When complemen-
tary regulatory instruments, such as effort-adjusted capital-requirements, are
available to government, this capital tax-rate decreases with an increase in
supervisory effectiveness. The paper’s conclusion is that bailout guarantees
should only co-exist with some form of effective banking supervision to ensure
that the effects of moral hazard are mitigated, which reinforces the view that
emerging economies can signal their financial reputation and also contribute
to reducing the risk of future crises only by implementing good governance
and effective supervisory procedures in their financial systems.
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1 Introduction
The consensus view that emerged from the analysis of the East Asian “twin
crises” in 1990’s highlights the interaction between structural microeconomic
problems and inappropriate macroeconomic policies as being a crucial de-
terminant of these phenomena. The exact nature of this interaction is un-
clear, however. Two hypotheses are usually advanced to explain “twin crises”
events: the first, stresses market failure, namely the sudden shift in market
sentiment that rapidly propagated itself regionally and which lead to financial
turmoil. According to this viewpoint, market turmoil was more severe due to
policies of financial-market deregulation and of capital-account liberalisation
in the affected economies; the second, focuses instead on government failure,
both at a micro and macro level.
Common to both hypotheses, however, is the view that financial system
fragility played an important role in explaining the “twin crises”, as is clear
from the following inter-related stylised facts: first, governments provided
either explicit or implicit bailout guarantees of liabilities denominated in for-
eign currency, which led banks to under-invest in risk management techniques
and to overlend; second, banks failed to adequately hedge against foreign ex-
change rate risk, given the prevalence of fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate
arrangements; and, third, a lending boom usually preceded the occurrence of
an exchange rate crisis. Taken together, these factors meant that the bank-
ing sector accumulated substantial foreign debt as it perceived itself to be
immune from exchange rate risk. The financial system therefore became
particularly prone to serious illiquidity problems in the event of a currency
crisis. This state of affairs was further exacerbated by weak and/or inade-
quate financial supervision which could have mitigated the banking sector’s
excessive risk-taking behaviour.
The present research is motivated by the fact that the taxation implica-
tions of “twin crises” have generally not been the subject of detailed analysis.
Specifically, it explores the interaction between foreign-debt bailout guaran-
tees, financial supervision and optimal factor taxation. Understanding this
interaction is important since the implicit system of financial insurance pro-
vided by governments is equivalent to a stock of contingent public liabilities,
which is not reflected in the deficit figures until the crisis occurs (Corsetti,
Pesenti & Roubini, 1998). In other words, the bailout guarantees represent
a serious burden on future fiscal imbalances even though fiscal deficits are
low ex-ante. In turn, this observation suggests that the post-crisis budget
situation is particularly relevant for the determination of taxation policy,
especially when bailouts have to be honoured once a crises occurs.
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The analysis is undertaken using an original stylised two-period model of
an emerging economy in which government solves a Ramsey taxation prob-
lem. The analysis’ main result establishes that the capital tax-rate is higher
under bailout guarantees in comparison to the no bailout case. The reason
is that there is a corrective-motive for capital taxation, in addition to the
revenue-raising one that underpins government expenditure, i.e. a higher
capital tax-rate will counteract the moral hazard induced increase in bank
lending. Thus, the fact that taxation is distortionary is useful under bailout
guarantees as it changes capital usage in the desired direction by ensuring
that banks monitor more and lend less.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 briefly re-
views the “twin crises” literature. Section 3 presents the analytical framework
and establishes the nature of banking behaviour under bailout guarantees.
The taxation issue is addressed in section 4, which also considers the effect
of financial supervision on the optimal capital tax rate. Section 5 concludes.
The appendix contains the proofs of propositions.
2 “Twin Crises” Stylised Facts
The nature and scope of the financial and currency crises in East Asia has mo-
tivated numerous studies which sought to determine the factors that caused
these phenomena. By drawing upon some of these studies, this section seeks
to identify the more relevant features of the “twin crises”.1 Two hypotheses
are usually advanced to explain crises events: the first, stresses market fail-
ure, namely the sudden shift in market sentiment that rapidly propagated
itself regionally and which lead to financial turmoil. According to this view-
point, market turmoil was more severe due to policies of financial-market
deregulation and of capital-account liberalisation in the affected economies;
the second, focuses instead on government failure, both at a micro and macro
level. Common to both hypotheses, however, is the acceptance that financial
system fragility played an important role in explaining the “twin crises”.
Financial fragility, in turn, is the outcome of the interplay of both struc-
tural microeconomic problems and inappropriate macroeconomic policies.
This observation accords with Diaz-Alejandro’s (1985) interpretation of the
1981-1983 Chilean crisis, which proved to be remarkably prophetic of the
1As such, it does not purport to be a detailed survey of the “twin crises” literature. For
a comprehensive introduction to this literature, refer to Sachs, Tornell & Velasco (1996),
Chang & Velasco (1998a,b), Corsetti et al. (1998b,c), Edwards (1999), Eichengreen &
Hausmann (1999), Kaminsky & Reinhart (1999) and Mishkin (1999).
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East Asian “twin crises”. Not surprisingly, his insights have spawned an
alternative approach to understanding financial and currency crises, the so-
called “third-generation” models. These models differ sharply from earlier
ones based solely on government’s macro-economic misbehaviour. “First-
generation” models, for example, attribute the erosion of foreign exchange re-
serves and the eventual currency crash to large money-financed fiscal deficits
(Krugman, 1979). Models of the “second-generation”, meanwhile, rely on
government-initiated devaluations that seek to address a rise in unemploy-
ment and/or a growing external imbalance (Obstfeld, 1994).
In relation to inappropriate macroeconomic policies, the factors advanced
in the literature include the choice of exchange rate regime, high current-
account deficits, excessive capital inflows and loose fiscal policies. Sachs,
Tornell & Velasco (1996) find, however, that these factors are generally not
supported by the data, as do Frankel & Rose (1996). Moreover, there is no
unique pattern of behaviour for basic macroeconomic variables in the buildup
to a crisis. For example, the current account is not always in deficit while
most government budgets were either in balance or even showed surpluses.
The absence of fiscal imbalances, however, should not be interpreted as per-
vasive evidence against the fiscal roots of the East Asian crises. According
to Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini (1998), the implicit system of government-
provided financial insurance is equivalent to a stock of contingent public
liabilities, which is not reflected in the deficit figures until the crisis occurs.
In other words, the bailout guarantees represent a serious burden on future
fiscal imbalances even though fiscal deficits are low ex-ante.
Sachs et al. (1996) find instead that low foreign exchange reserves, a real
exchange rate appreciation, a recent lending boom and the composition of
capital inflows to be more important indicators of a country’s vulnerability
to financial crises. Short-term capital inflows were found to be especially sig-
nificant predictors of financial crises, as their composition can quickly render
the domestic financial system internationally illiquid, i.e. when a country’s
short-term foreign-currency liabilities exceed the amount of foreign currency
that it can access in the immediate short-run.2 In addition, most banks that
intermediated the capital-inflows failed to adequately hedge against exchange
rate risk. This failing meant that the financial system was also more prone to
unfavourable movements in the exchange rate, as banks’ repayment burden
effectively increased should the domestic currency depreciate.3 Under this
2Chang & Velasco (1998a) develop a model based on the illiquidity of the domestic
financial system, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for financial crises to occur.
3According Eichengreen & Hausmann (1999), a fixed exchange rate is another example
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circumstances, a liquidity crisis easily translated itself into a fully fledged
currency crisis, which ultimately led to the collapse of the fixed exchange
rate regime itself.
With respect to the role played by the domestic lending boom, two ex-
planations are advanced. The first highlights the process of swift capital-
account liberalisation that led to an influx of capital which was then inter-
mediated by the banking sector. Sachs et al. (1996), however, suggests that
there is no obvious correlation between the size of the capital inflow and the
ensuing variation in bank credit, especially as many countries had opened
their capital accounts for some time prior to the crisis’ onset. Instead, weak
financial-market regulation and supervision procedures, coupled with easier
and cheaper external sources of funds, was found to be the more significant
explanation of the lending boom as well as the increase in the riskiness of
banks’ portfolios. Not surprisingly, these conditions proved to be disastrous
when market sentiment turned negative.
The last finding raises the issue of inappropriate microeconomic policies
that were pervasive in the pre-crises financial sectors and which resulted in
financial fragility. These failures include weak financial regulation and lax
supervision, low capital-adequacy ratios, the lack of incentive-compatible de-
posit insurance schemes, distorted incentives for project selection, corrupt
lending practices and non-market criteria for the allocation of credit. In
some economies, the inadequate financial supervision reflected the relation-
ship nature of banking in which banks were able to successfully lobby banking
regulators. In other instances, the poor supervision resulted from the lack of
resources and the use of inadequate supervisory techniques (Mishkin, 1999).
In all cases, the direct consequence of this and other failings was the
existence of significant moral hazard effects in the financial sector, e.g. un-
profitable projects were re-financed through cheaper external borrowing be-
cause foreign creditors expected that domestic agents would be bailed by
government in the event of a crisis. In turn, the perverse incentives due to
moral hazard encouraged excessive risk-taking and the accumulation of short-
term foreign debt. This interpretation of events in East Asia is advanced by
Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini (1998a,b), who argue that the moral hazard prob-
lem, allied with regulatory inadequacies and close links between private and
public institutions, resulted in perverse incentives under which the corporate
of an implicit government-provided guarantee against the risk of exchange-rate changes.
For a theoretical model that considers the links between hedging, financial fragility and
fixed exchange regimes, refer to Burnside, Eichenbaum & Rebelo (1999).
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and financial sectors operated in the region. As such, the moral hazard effect
magnified the financial vulnerability that followed financial-market liberali-
sation in the 1990’s and exposed the region to macroeconomic and financial
shocks.4
In the wake of the East Asian economic and financial turmoil, some impor-
tant lessons have been learnt: first, fixed exchange rates are dangerous when
large capital inflows co-exist with financial sector fragility; second, the lack
of adequate regulation and financial supervision renders emerging economies
more vulnerable to crises. As such, an effective supervisory system is essen-
tial to curtail excessive risk-taking by the banking system (Mishkin, 1999);
third, policies that limit short-term foreign borrowing should be considered
when conditions warrant it. In conclusion, it appears that government misbe-
haviour was a crucial determinant of the “twin crises” but not in the manner
usually invoked. Indeed, in the case of East Asia, the orthodox explanations
of governments running large deficits financed by the inflationary printing of
money are not appropriate.
Instead, the implicit or explicit provision of bailout guarantees is more
relevant given that their existence led to significant moral hazard effects in
the predominantly bank-based economies. The moral hazard problem was
further aggravated by the co-existence of inadequate financial supervision and
fixed exchange rate regimes. Together, these factors led to financial fragility
as the domestic banking system accumulated substantial foreign liabilities
in order to finance its lending boom. It is this important insight which will
motivate this study’s analytical framework, as developed in the next section.
3 Economic Environment
The stylised economy lasts two periods (t = 1, 2) and has a fixed exchange
rate regime. The exchange rate is subject to a possible devaluation shock in
t = 2, which introduces macroeconomic uncertainty into the economy. There
are two types of households, vis. workers and bankers (hereafter banks). Let
J denote the unit-measure set of banks and assume, without loss of generality,
that the set of workers is of the same measure. A representative bank is
endowed with homogenous skills and capital that allows it to offer banking
services. It also enjoys full and exclusive access to international financial
markets.
4For models based on the moral hazard interpretation, see Cosetti et. al. (1998a) and
Chinn & Kletzer (2000).
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Workers’ financial market participation is limited to their savings in the
form of interest-bearing bank deposits. Banks act as typical financial inter-
mediaries by transforming deposits into loans, which then fund firms’ pro-
duction plans. Domestic savings are, however, insufficient to fund production
plans and so bank loans are partially financed by foreign-currency debt. The
bank’s exchange rate risk is not hedged by assumption. Finally, banks face
a microeconomic risk which occurs when firms are unsuccessful in setting up
their borrowed capital and so default on their loans.
Let st denote the stochastic state of the world at time t, where st follows a
time-invariant Markov chain. A state of the world consists of macroeconomic
uncertainty, due to the risk of exchange rate devaluation, andmicroeconomic
uncertainty regarding the performance of banks’ loan portfolios. In the first
state (st = 1), the economy has a high loan-performance regime and an
exchange rate of E1 = 1. The proportion of loans that honour their contrac-
tual obligations in this state is 0 < λ1 < 1. In the second (st = 2), the
economy switches to a low loan-performance regime with 0 < λ2 < 1 and
simultaneously experiences a devaluation shock (E2 > E1). The two shocks
are positively correlated in order to capture the stylised feature of poorer
loan-portfolio performance in the post-devaluation economic environment,
hence λ2 < λ1. The probability transition matrix is given by
T =
·
1− q q
0 1
¸
where q = Pr(st = 2|st = 1) denotes the probability of switching to st = 2
at time t conditional on it having been in st = 1 before.5
3.1 Agents’ Preferences and Constraints
Workers are identical with respect to endowments and consumption prefer-
ences. Each worker is endowed with a non-stochastic, tax-exempt capital
endowment (kW > 0) in t = 1 and with one unit of leisure in t = 2. A worker
can decide to forego some of his leisure endowment in exchange for a wage
which he earns by supplying labour to firms during t = 2. A representative
5Note that this characterisation implies that s1 = 1 occurs with probability one and
that only two histories (st) are possible during t = 2, i.e. s2 = [s2 = 2, s1 = 1] and
s2 = [s2 = 1, s1 = 1], which occur with probabilities 0 < q < 1 and (1 − q) respectively.
In general, an economy’s history at time t is given by the set st = [st, st−1, ..., s1]. The
probability of a particular history st occurring at time t, conditional on the observed initial
state s1, is denoted by π(st|s1).
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worker’s lifetime expected utility is given by
U(cW ) =
X
st
π(st|s1){u(cW1 (st)) + δ[u(cW2 (st), 1− n(st))]} (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal subjective discount rate. A worker’s
consumption in period t is denoted by cWt (s
t) while his labour supply is
denoted by n(st). The momentary utility function u(·, ·) is twice continuously
differentiable, concave and separable in its arguments.
The worker’s problem is to choose his level of consumption for each period
and his supply of labour in t = 2. The return on savings and wages are a
worker’s sole sources of income during t = 2, and so his budget constraints
are given by
cW1 (s
t) + d(st) ≤ kW (2)
cW2 (s
t) ≤ R(st)d(st) + (1− τ(st))w(st)n(st) (3)
where d(st) are his deposits, R(st) = 1+r(st) is the gross interest rate, w(st)
are wages and τ(st) is the labour tax-rate.
A bank has an initial endowment of capital (kB > 0) and risk neutral
preferences, so that its expected lifetime utility is given by
V (cB) = δ
X
st
π(st|s1)v(cB2 (st)) (4)
where v(·) is the momentary utility function and cB2 (st) denotes a bank’s
consumption in t = 2. In the first period, a bank solves its banking game
(discussed below) in order to determine its optimal monitoring and lending
levels. It is assumed that the sum of a bank’s capital endowment and its
deposits is insufficient to fund the total volume of firms’ investment plans
for all monitoring levels. The required shortfall, denoted by l∗(st), is thus
borrowed in international capital markets at an exogenous gross interest rate
(R∗) which is payable in t = 2. The foreign loan is subsequently converted
into domestic currency at the exchange rate of E1. Under these assumptions,
a bank’s budget constraints are given by
l(st) ≤ d(st) + l∗(st) + kB (5)
cB2 ≤ ΠB(e, l, rl, st) (6)
where l(st) denotes a bank’s lending level and ΠB(e, l, rl, st) its profit func-
tion, which is presented and discussed in the appendix.
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3.2 Government
The government undertakes no spending in t = 1 but expends an exogenous
amount g(st) ≥ 0 in t = 2. It is assumed that only a second-best tax system is
available to the government in which taxes are chosen so as to minimise tax-
induced distortions, i.e. Ramsey taxation.6 Expenditure is therefore financed
by taxing capital and labour at flat-rates z(st) and τ(st) respectively.
Moreover, the use of second-best taxation presupposes that the govern-
ment can commit itself to its announced fiscal policy. As such, the govern-
ment does not adjust g(st) ex-post so as to avoid raising the revenue needed
to finance total expenditure. The commitment assumption also precludes
the government from dishonouring its bailout obligations.
Note that stochastic determination of the world’s state in t = 2 consti-
tutes an exogenous shock to the government’s budget constraint. In other
words, it will potentially expend an amount in bailouts B(st) > 0 when
st = 2 and zero otherwise. The government’s budget constraint in t = 2 is
thus given by
g(st) +B(st) ≤ z(st)rl(st)k(st) + τ(st)w(st)n(st) (7)
where k(st) denotes capital usage and rl(st) the rental rate of capital.7
6For an introduction into the optimal taxation literature, see Judd (1985), Chamley
(1986), Bovenberg (1994), Zhu (1997) and Renström (1999).
7Following Chamley (1986), tax-rates are viewed as the relevant decision variables
when government solves its Ramsey taxation problem. Hence, the two pairs of numbers
(τ(st), z(st)) and (w(st), rl(st)) are reduced to just one pair by utilising the firm’s first-
order conditions (FOC) and the equilibrium factor-market outcomes:
r˜l(st) = (1− z(st))rl(st)
w˜(st) = (1− τ(st))w(st)
Given the production function’s linear homogeneity properties, government revenues can
then be rewritten as
(rl(st)− r˜l(st))k(st) + (w(st)− w˜(st))n(st)
= Q(k(st), n(st))− r˜l(st)k(st)− w˜(st)n(st) (7’)
after directly incorporating the firm’s FOC into the budget constraint.
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3.3 Firms
Production is undertaken by a continuum of identical firms with measure one.
A typical firm lacks the capital needed to initiate production and so seeks
a loan from a single bank during t = 1. In the absence of any uncertainty
at this stage, the loan application receives the requested financing. The firm
then proceeds to set up its borrowed capital and, if successful, will begin
production during t = 2. If not, the borrowed capital is completely dissipated
and the firm will default on its contractual obligations.
Each firm operates an identical technology that produces a single ho-
mogenous good using the borrowed capital and labour, which is hired in a
competitive market. The production function, denoted by Q(·), is strictly
concave and linearly homogenous. A representative firm maximises its profit
function,
ΠF = Q(k(st), n(st))− rl(st)k(st)− w(st)n(st)
by choosing the optimum levels of each production factor. In doing so, it
takes as given the market-determined rental rates of labour and of capital.
The FOC of the firm’s problem are given by
rl(st) = Qk(s
t) (8)
w(st) = Qn(s
t) (9)
where subscripts denote here, as elsewhere, the partial derivatives of the
functions under consideration.8 As usual, the FOC imply that factor inputs
are employed up till the point where each factor’s marginal product equals its
respective rental price. Upon aggregation, equilibrium condition (8) yields
the demand schedule for bank loans, denoted by D(rl), which is positive and
decreasing in rl, given the above assumptions.
4 Banking in a Small Open Economy
4.1 Banking Game
The timing of the banking game (see Figure 1) is as follows: at the begin-
ning of t = 1, the government commits itself to a specific fiscal policy. At
the same time, the banking regulator announces the regulatory regime to be
8In order to ensure that 0 < Qk(st) < 1 in equilibrium, the economy is assumed
to be subject to a minimum capital utilisation constraint or, equivalently, a mimimum
production constraint.
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implemented. Firms then apply for loans which are supplied at the equilib-
rium market rate. After lending has taken place, microeconomic uncertainty
is introduced when Nature privately reveals to firms their likelihood of a
successful capital set-up process in t = 2. In the game’s next-to-last stage,
banks choose their optimum level of monitoring and decide which loans are
to be recalled.9 Finally, Nature determines whether or not the exchange rate
is devalued in t = 2 and, in doing so, introduces macroeconomic uncertainty
into the game.
A bank cannot observe the outcome of a firm’s capital set-up process
and so, from its perspective, the risk of loan default is post-contractual in
nature. With the advent of microeconomic uncertainty, a bank’s portfolio
comprises firms that will repay their loans but also some that will not. In
order to improve the expected return on lending, a bank will monitor its loan
portfolio prior to the onset of the capital set-up phase.
This improvement is possible because banks have exclusive access to a
monitoring technology that imperfectly classifies firms on the basis of their
success in setting-up the borrowed capital: a “good” firm is expected to
succeed while a “bad” one is expected to fail. “Bad” firms are shutdown
after the firm has observed its type but before it proceeds to the capital
set-up stage, thereby allowing a bank to recover its lent capital.
In other words, monitoring improves the expected return on lending be-
cause the final composition of a bank’s loan portfolio contains a greater
proportion of “good” firms when compared to the initial composition, given
that it recovers the capital lent to firms classified as “bad”. However, a bank
also loses out on a higher return when it wrongly shuts down a “good” firm.
As such, this trade-off will have to be taken into account (in conjunction
with monitoring costs) when banks decide their optimal level of monitoring.
For the formal specification and discussion of banking technology, refer to
the appendix.
4.2 Banking Equilibrium
The banking industry is assumed to be competitive so each bank is a price
taker both in lending and in deposit rates. For a given capital taxation policy,
a banking industry equilibrium is defined as follows:
9Banking models based on asymmetric informational differences typically focus on the
optimal contract that solves either an adverse selection or a moral hazard problem. Here,
the focus will instead be on banks’ actual monitoring and lending behaviour.
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Definition 1: An equilibrium for the banking industry is a level of
monitoring (eˆ), a level of lending (lˆ) and a lending rate (rl) such that
(i) the pair (eˆ, lˆ) maximises the bank’s expected profit;
(ii) the bank’s expected profit is zero.
(iii) the lending rate rl clears the market for loans.
4.2.1 No Bailout Guarantees
The banking game is solved using backward induction. As such, a bank first
chooses the level of monitoring effort from its opportunity set Φ(λ¯) (defined in
the appendix) so as to maximise objective function (4) subject to constraints
(5) and (6). Then, it proceeds to determine the level of lending, taking as
given the optimal level of monitoring. The following proposition characterises
the banking equilibrium when bailout guarantees do not exist:
Proposition 1 The banking equilibrium without bailout guarantees is unique
and has the following properties:
(1) The optimal level of monitoring, eˆs, is given by
α0(eˆs)λ¯r˜ls − β0(eˆs)(1− λ¯) = c0(eˆs) (10)
(2) The optimal level of lending, lˆs, is given by
lˆs = F (eˆs, r˜ls, λ¯)− E¯R∗ (11)
(3) The equilibrium lending rate, rls, is given byZ
j∈J
lˆs = D(rls) (12)
Proof. Refer to the appendix.
The economic intuition underlying (10) is simple: in equilibrium, mon-
itoring effort is expended until the marginal benefit of monitoring equals
its marginal cost. The total marginal benefit comprises two elements: the
increased return on lending due to the higher proportion of “good” firms con-
tained in the final composition of a bank’s loan portfolio; and, the reduction
in potential default losses as a result of the “bad” loans that are correctly
recalled. By design, banking behaviour here is unaffected by bailout guar-
antees. As such, the banking game’s outcome is accordingly designated as
the social solution, where eˆs denotes the social monitoring level and lˆs the
social lending level. Finally, note that equation (10) implicitly defines the
function eˆs(λ¯, r˜ls), given that the conditions of the implicit function theorem
are satisfied (refer to the appendix).
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4.2.2 Bailout Guarantees
A bank finds it optimal to default on foreign-debt loans when its profit is
negative, i.e. when the combined effect of an exchange rate devaluation
and of a lower loan-repayment rate in the second state lead to a loss (see
assumption A1). When this happens, a bank declares bankruptcy and will
not pay foreign creditors, nor will it pay itself the opportunity cost of being in
banking.10 Upon bankruptcy, the bank’s remaining assets are appropriated
by the government who first proceeds to pays out domestic depositors and
then foreign creditors. The bailout amount will therefore be the difference
between a bank’s foreign debt and its net worth at that time, i.e.11
B(st) = [E2R
∗ − F (eˆp, r˜lp,λ(st))]k(st) + ϕ(k(st))−E2R∗kB (13)
When bailout guarantees exist, a bank’s objective function is given by
V = (1− q)ΠB(e, l, r˜l,λ1) + qmax{ΠB(e, l, r˜l,λ2), 0} (14)
As before, a representative bank’s problem is to first choose the effort level
that maximises (14), where the opportunity set is now defined by Φ(λ1), and
then its optimal lending level.
Proposition 2 The banking equilibrium with bailout guarantees is unique
and has the following properties:
(1) The optimal level of monitoring, eˆp, is given by
α0(eˆp)λ1r˜lp − β0(eˆp)(1− λ1) = c0(eˆp) (15)
(2) The optimal level of lending, lˆp, is given by
lˆp = F (eˆp, r˜lp,λ1)−E1R∗ (16)
(3) The equilibrium lending rate, rlp, is given byZ
j∈J
lˆp = D(rlp) (17)
Proof. Refer to the appendix.
10For the sake of simplicitly, defaults are taken to be costless. This assumption does not
qualtitatively affect the analysis’ results.
11The bank’s net worth is equal to F (eˆp, r˜lp,λ(st))k(st)− ϕ(k(st))−R(st)d(st).
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Let eˆp denote the private optimal monitoring level and lˆp the private op-
timal lending level. Note that equation (15) implicitly defines the function
eˆp(λ1, r˜lp), which differs from eˆ
s(λ¯, r˜ls) derived previously. The exact relation-
ship between monitoring and lending behaviour with and without bailout
guarantees is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Existence of Moral Hazard) The existence of bailout
guarantees leads to a lower level of monitoring and a higher level of lend-
ing.
Proof. This result is derived using a comparative static analysis that
studies the impact of changes in the loan repayment rate (λ) on the endoge-
nous variables (refer to the appendix for full details). The analysis establishes
that the optimal level of monitoring and the lending rate are both decreasing
functions of λ whilst the optimal lending level is an increasing function. As
such, lending under bailout guarantees is higher (lˆp > lˆs) and the lending
rate lower (r˜lp < r˜
l
s), for a given capital tax-rate. Moreover, optimal monitor-
ing is an increasing function of the equilibrium lending rate. Together, these
results imply that eˆp(λ1, r˜lp) < eˆ
p(λ1, r˜ls) < eˆ
s(λ¯, r˜ls).
The economic intuition of the above result is that bailout guarantees
effectively insure banks against both exchange rate and loan default risk, as
is to be expected. Consider, for example, their impact on monitoring. For
a given lending level and lending rate, a bank’s private marginal curve will
always lie below the social marginal revenue curve, as shown in Figure 2.
Marginal revenue will therefore be lower whenever the loan repayment rate
is higher, for all effort levels.12 Since private monitoring is determined by
λ1 whilst social monitoring is determined by the lower repayment rate, λ¯,
the private solution will entail a lower monitoring level in equilibrium. In
other words, monitoring is simply less rewarding economically when bailout
guarantees exist.
12Letting λ denote a generic repayment rate, the total revenue function is given by
TR = (1 + α(e)λr˜l − β(e)(1− λ))l while the marginal revenue associated with additional
monitoring is TRe = (α0(e)λr˜l−β0(e)(1−λ))l. Under the assumptions made in this paper,
TReλ = (α0(e)r˜l + β0(e))l < 0 and TRλ = α(e)r˜l + β(e))l > 0.
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5 Factor Taxation
5.1 Ramsey Problem
Recall that the government’s exogenous expenditure in period t = 2 is fi-
nanced entirely by tax revenues obtained using distortionary flat-rate taxes
on capital and labour. Formally, the government’s Ramsey problem is to de-
termine the optimal level of capital and labour tax-rates at the beginning of
period t = 1. The elements that make up the Ramsey problem are as follows:
Definition 2: A feasible allocation is the set {cW1 (st), cW2 (st), cB2 (st), g(st),
k(st), n(st)} which satisfies the government’s resource constraint.
Definition 3: A price system is the set {w(st), rl(st), r(st)} whose
elements are non-negative.
Definition 4: A government policy is the set (g(st), B(st), τ(st), z(st))
whose elements are non-negative.
Definition 5: A competitive equilibrium is a feasible allocation, a price
system, and a government policy such that
(i) given the price system and government policy, the allocation
solves both the bank’s problem and the worker’s problem; and
(ii) given the allocation and price system, the government’s policy
satisfies the government’s budget constraint.
The Ramsey problem is motivated by the multiplicity of competitive equi-
libria, each indexed by a different government policy:
Definition 6: Given agents’ aggregate capital endowment (kagg), the
government’s Ramsey problem is to choose a competitive equilibrium
that maximises its social welfare function.
The government solves the Ramsey problem by maximising the social
welfare function subject to budget constraint (7), its resource constraint and
the equilibrium behavioural responses of the private sector. The resource
constraint at the beginning of t = 2 is given by
g(st) +B(st) ≤ [F (e, rl,λ(st))− E(st)R∗)]k(st)− ϕ(k(st)) +R(st)kagg
+ w(st)n(st)− [R(st)cW1 (st) + cW2 (st) + cB2 (st)] (18)
The agents’ equilibrium behavourial constraints must also be included as the
government needs to take their reaction to the tax system into account when
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designing its optimal taxation policy.13 The Lagragean formulation of the
Ramsey problem at time t = 1 is as follows:
L =
X
st
π(st|s1){θ[u(cW1 (st)) + δ(u(cW2 (st), 1− n(st))] + (1− θ)δv(cB2 (st))
+µ1R
−1(st)[Q(k(st), n(st))− r˜l(st)k(st)− w˜(st)n(st)−B(st)− g(st)]
+µ2[k
agg − cW1 (st) +R−1(st)(((F (e, rl,λ(st))−E(st)R∗))k(st)− ϕ(k(st))
+w(st)n(st)− cW2 (st)− cB2 (st)−B(st)− g(st))]
+η1
£
δuc(cW2 (s
t), 1− n(st))−R−1(st)uc(cW1 (st))
¤
+η2
£
R−1(st)uc(c
W
1 (s
t))w˜(st)− δun(cW2 (st), 1− n(st))
¤
+η3
£
δ(F (e, r˜l,λ(st))−E(st)R∗ − ϕk(k(st)))
¤
+η4
£
δ(Fe(e, r˜l,λ(st))k(st))
¤} (19)
where 0 < θ ≤ 1 is the weight attached to the utility of workers and where
ηi (i = 1, 2, 3, 4) are the multipliers associated with agents’ behavioural con-
straints. The Lagragean multiplier of the government’s budget constraint is
denoted by µ1 while that of its resource constraint is µ2.
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Consider now the government’s problem when bailout guarantees do not
exist, so that B(st) = 0 in (19). The situation is particularly relevant as
it will provide a natural benchmark against which to compare the solution
obtained when bailout guarantees exist, which is discussed further on.
Proposition 4 The labour and capital tax-rates are non-negative in the ab-
sence of bailout guarantees.
Proof. Refer to the appendix for details. LetE[x(st)] ≡
P
st π(s
t|s1)x(st)
denote the mathematical expectation conditional upon the information avail-
able at time t = 1. Consider first capital taxation: the FOC that implicitly
defines the optimal tax-rate (in expected value terms) is given by (A11),
η3 = E[R
−1(st)[µ1(r
l
s(s
t)− r˜ls(st)) + µ2(F (eˆs, rls,λ(st))− F (eˆs, r˜ls,λ(st))]]
(20)
after equations (8) and (11) have been substituted into it. To obtain the
desired result, note that E[R−1(st)(rls(s
t) − r˜ls(st))] ≥ 0 (by definition) and
13For the derivation of these constraints, refer to equations (A3)-(A9) in the appendix.
14Note that agents’ budget constraints are not explicitly included as these become redun-
dant when the government satisfies its budget constraint and when the resource constraint
holds.
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that E[R−1(st)(F (eˆsrls,λ(s
t))−F (eˆs, r˜ls,λ(st)))] ≥ 0 due to fact that dlˆsdz < 0
when evaluated at eˆs. Finally, η3 is always non-negative and only positive
when the corresponding constraint is binding. Hence, the FOC is only sat-
isfied when the sum of the RHS above is non-negative, i.e. if rls(s
t) ≥ r˜ls(st)
or equivalently, when z(st) ≥ 0. Similar reasoning applies to the taxation of
labour when using (A10) so that τ(st) ≥ 0.
The above proposition establishes a revenue-raising motive for factor tax-
ation when g(st) > 0. The reason for this is clear upon inspection of (20),
which has a simple interpretation: E[R−1(st)(rls(s
t) − r˜ls(st))] is expected
capital revenue while E[R−1(st)(F (eˆs, rls,λ(s
t))−F (eˆs, r˜ls,λ(st)))] is the tax-
induced distortion in bank lending. Here, a marginal increase in the capital
tax-rate will increase revenue but will also reduce lending or, equivalently,
capital usage. The social marginal value of these two terms is given by µ1
and µ2 respectively. In equilibrium, the weighted sum of these two effects
must be non-negative when discounted back to t = 1.15
Proposition 5 When bailout guarantees exist, the labour tax-rate is non-
negative while the capital tax-rate is strictly positive.
Proof. Government bailouts do not affect the FOC of labour (A10),
hence the optimal labour tax-rate will remain unchanged. However, the
same is not true of capital as the relevant FOC is now given by:
η3 + µ1E[R
−1(st)Bk(s
t)] = µ1E[R
−1(st)(rlp(s
t)− r˜lp(st))]
+ µ2E[R
−1(st)(F (eˆp, rlp,λ(s
t))− F (eˆp, r˜lp,λ(st))] (21)
Note that expected capital revenue is affected by
Bk(s
t) = [E2R
∗ − F (eˆp, r˜lp,λ(st)] + ϕk(k(st))
which is positive for all k(st) > 0, given assumption (A1). After applying the
reasoning used in the proof of proposition 4, it is clear that rlp(s
t) > r˜lp(s
t)
since E[R−1(st)Bk(st)] > 0 necessarily implies that the RHS of (21) must
also be positive, hence z(st) > 0.
This last result implies that the capital tax-rate under bailout guarantees
is higher than that which would hold when these do not exist. The reason is
that there is now a corrective-motive for capital taxation, in addition to the
15When the capital and labour tax-rates are set to zero, this is tantamount to asserting
that g(st) = 0, which also corresponds to the Pareto-efficient market outcome.
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revenue-raising one discussed earlier. As before, a marginal increase in the
capital tax-rate increases revenue but reduces capital usage at the same time.
Unlike the case of no bailouts, however, there is also an increase in expected
revenue due to the marginal reduction of the bailout amount in response to
the tax-induced decline in capital usage, i.e. Bk(st) > 0. The net effect on
expected revenue is given by E[R−1(st)(rl(st)− r˜l(st))−Bk(st)]. The optimal
capital tax-rate is therefore set at a level which ensures that the weighted
sum of two effects is non-negative when discounted back to t = 1.
In other words, the fact that taxation is distortionary is useful here as it
will change capital usage in the desired direction. This corrective rationale
implies that a positive capital tax-rate, in effect, counteracts the increased
lending induced by the moral hazard effect of bailout guarantees. The desir-
ability of relying exclusively on capital taxation to mitigate moral hazard is
questionable, however, if one bears in mind that a positive capital tax-rate
will also reduce the level of production in the economy. This observation
suggests that moral hazard might be better addressed with the use of alter-
native instruments. The next section looks at one such instrument, namely
financial supervision, in order to assess its ultimate impact on the optimal
capital tax-rate under bailout guarantees.
5.2 Financial Supervision
Financial supervision is able to mitigate moral hazard when it is effective.
Supervisory effectiveness, in turn, is dependent upon the choice of regulatory
regime. The issue of regulatory design is, however, too extensive and beyond
the scope of this paper. As such, the analysis considers a simple regulatory
regime, namely an effort-adjusted capital requirement. The regime choice is
motivated by the fact that it is an incentives-based regulatory scheme, which
will allow for the analysis of its impact on banks’ monitoring behaviour.
Moreover, its enforceability depends on a varying degree of supervisory effec-
tiveness, which accords with the stylised fact of weak and inadequate financial
supervision in the countries affected by “twin crises”.
5.2.1 Supervision Technology
The banking regulator can neither observe a bank’s actual monitoring level
nor infer it from its level of lending. She must therefore make use of an imper-
fect supervision technology in order to ensure that the capital-requirement
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is implemented.16 Let e˜ denote the regulator’s perception of a bank’s moni-
toring level, which is formed as follows:
e˜ = (1− γ)eˆs + γe 0 ≤ γ < 1 (22)
The intuition of this formulation is that the accuracy of the regulator’s per-
ception is determined by technical and institutional factors, which are cap-
tured by the parameter γ. For example, completely inadequate supervision
(γ = 0) implies that the regulator incorrectly perceives a bank to be pursuing
eˆs. On the other hand, her perception becomes increasingly more accurate
as γ → 1, which corresponds to greater supervisory effectiveness. An alter-
native interpretation of financial supervision is obtained by rewriting (22)
as
eˆs − e˜ = γ(eˆs − e) (22’)
Here, supervision provides the regulator with an estimate of the moral hazard
effect (eˆs−e), which is more plausible in informational terms as the regulator
need not know either eˆs or e.
5.2.2 Capital Requirements
When designing the capital requirement, the regulator must take a bank’s
response to it into account. Specifically, she must ensure that a bank has a
positive incentive to pursue a level of monitoring greater than eˆp when the
capital requirement is in force. With this in mind, the appropriate effort-
adjusted capital requirement is given by
kBcr(e˜) =
ϕ(l) + (E2R∗ − F (e˜, r˜l,λ2))l
E2R∗
∀e ∈ (eˆp, eo(λ1,λ2) (23)
as shown in the appendix. In a nutshell, the economic rationale underlying
(23) is that increased monitoring will decrease a bank’s loss in the second
state, which constitutes a positive incentive. In other words, an increase in
a bank’s monitoring effort will reduce the capital-requirement it will have
to comply with. When implemented, it has the following effect on banking
behaviour under bailout guarantees:
16The supervision technology described here is based on Khambu (1990), who studies
regulatory effectiveness when risk is concealable from the banking regulator.
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Proposition 6 The banking equilibrium under an effort-adjusted capital re-
quirement regime has the following properties:
(i) the monitoring level is greater,
(ii) the lending level is lower, and
(iii) the lending rate is greater
when compared to the no banking-regulation case.
Proof. The FOC w.r.t. monitoring is given by (A14’) which implicitly
defines the optimal monitoring level under a capital-requirement, denoted by
eˆcr(λ1,λ2, γ, r˜lcr), where r˜
l
cr is the equilibrium interest rate. The first result
follows from the design of the capital-requirement (refer to the appendix).
Note that eˆcr is bounded from below by ep(λ1, r˜lp), as the solution of (A14’)
is identical to that of (15) when γ = 0. Similarly, it is bounded from above
by eˆs(λ¯, r˜l) since eˆcr → eˆs(λ¯, r˜ls) when γ → 1. The remaining results follow
from the comparative static results derived earlier, together with the fact
that eˆp(λ1, r˜lp) ≤ eˆcr(λ1,λ2, γ, r˜lcr) < eˆs(λ¯, r˜ls).
The above proposition establishes that an effort-adjusted capital require-
ment regime is capable of mitigating the moral hazard effect. However, the
extent to which moral hazard is mitigated depends on the effectiveness of fi-
nancial supervision. When it is ineffective (γ = 0), a bank’s monitoring level
does not differ from the outcome of the no-regulation case. The exact rela-
tion between supervisory effectiveness and the capital tax-rate is contained
in the next proposition:
Proposition 7 The optimal capital tax-rate is highest whenever financial
supervision is least effective, and conversely.
Proof. The optimal capital tax-rate is a decreasing function of mon-
itoring effort, as shown in the appendix. This fact, in conjunction with
eˆp(λ1, r˜lp) < eˆ
cr(λ1,λ2, γ, r˜lcr) < eˆ
s(λ¯, r˜ls), establishes the result.
6 Conclusion
This paper explores the interaction between foreign-debt bailout guarantees,
financial supervision and optimal factor taxation. The context is that of a
pre-“twin crises” emerging market economy characterised by a fixed exchange
rate regime. The analysis is undertaken using an original model that seeks
to incorporate the relevant stylised facts of “twin crises”. With this in mind,
a model of banking is developed where banks monitor their loan portfolios in
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order to improve the expected rate of return. The existence of foreign-debt
bailouts effectively provide banks with a safety net and so are subject to
moral hazard.
The reason for this is that banks consider themselves to be immune from
unfavourable outcomes associated with the higher loan default rate and the
exchange rate shock in the second state. In other words, banks have increased
incentives for less monitoring and more lending when compared to the socially
desirable case. In addition, the quality of their loan portfolios is manifestly
inferior, as the ex-post portfolio composition contains a higher proportion of
loans that perform poorly when economic conditions are unfavourable.
The analysis’ main result establishes that the capital tax-rate is higher
under bailout guarantees in comparison to the no bailout case. The reason
is that there is a corrective-motive for capital taxation, in addition to the
revenue-raising one that underpins government expenditure, i.e. a higher
capital tax-rate will be needed to counteract the moral hazard induced in-
crease in bank lending. In other words, the fact that taxation is distortionary
is useful under bailout guarantees as it changes capital usage in the desired
direction by ensuring that banks monitor more and lend less.
The desirability of relying exclusively on capital taxation to mitigate
moral hazard is questionable, however, if one bears in mind that a higher
than “normal” capital tax-rate also reduces the level of production in the
economy. This observation suggests that moral hazard might be better ad-
dressed with the use of alternative instruments such as an effort-adjusted
capital requirement. When the latter is in force, the private level of monitor-
ing is greater, and the lending level lower when compared to the no-regulation
case. Furthermore, the analysis also establishes that the capital tax-rate in-
creases with a decrease in supervisory effectiveness. Indeed, it is highest
when financial supervision is least effective, and conversely.
The conclusion arising from these results is clear: bailout guarantees
should only co-exist with some form of effective banking supervision to ensure
the effects of moral hazard are mitigated. As such, it reinforces the view that
emerging economies can signal their financial reputation and contribute to
reducing the risk of future crises only by implementing good governance and
effective supervisory procedures in their financial systems. In addition, it
implies that a successful microeconomic financial policy will allow emerging
economies to have lower capital tax-rates making investment more attractive.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Nature of Banking
8.1.1 Banking Technology
Let Pr(G) = λ(st) denote the ex-ante probability of full repayment in the
absence of microeconomic uncertainty, and Pr(B) = 1−λ(st) that of default.
Upon monitoring, a bank refines this observational signal by (imperfectly)
classifying firms as being “good” or “bad”. Let e ∈ (0, 1) denote the monitor-
ing level and c(e) the monitoring cost function, which is increasing, strictly
convex and with c(0) = 0 and lim
e→1
c(e) = +∞.Monitoring is costly due to the
real resources expended in evaluating loans. After monitoring, a firm that is
correctly classified as “good” is allowed to continue onto the capital set-up
stage with probability Pr(A|G) = α(e).
However, banks can incur a type-II error with probability Pr(A|B) =
β(e) when a “bad” firm is incorrectly allowed to produce. The ex-post loan
acceptance probability is therefore given by
Pr(A) = α(e)λ(st) + β(e)(1− λ(st)) ∀e ∈ (0, 1)
where ∂ Pr(A)∂e ≤ 0 and
∂2 Pr(A)
∂e2 ≥ 0. Banking technology is monotonic with
α0(e) ≥ 0,α00(e) ≤ 0 and β0(e) ≤ 0,β00(e) ≥ 0. Although a full effort level
would ensure that only the “good” firms are retained, i.e. α(1) = 1 and
β(1) = 0, it will be prohibitively expensive to implement. As such, banks
will always choose an incomplete level of monitoring in equilibrium.17
8.1.2 Banking Profits
A bank’s profit function will differ according to whether or not it monitors
its loan portfolio. When it does not (and assuming no bailouts), the profit
function is given by
ΠB(l, r˜l) = (1 + r˜l)λ(st)l(st)− ϕ(l)−R(st)d(st)−E(st)R∗l∗(st)− c(kB)
(A1)
where (1 + r˜l) is the after-tax gross interest rate on lending and ϕ(l) = l
2
2
is
the real cost of lending l(st) units.18 The internal cost of financing a loan is
17Note also that a zero effort level will not improve precision beyond the original signal
so that Pr(A ∩ G) = λ(st) and Pr(A ∩ B) = 1 − λ(st), implying that loans are accepted
with probability one.
18The variable st will sometimes be omitted in order to simplify the analysis’ notation.
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R(st)d(st) while E(st )R∗l∗(st) is the external cost, which depends directly
on the exchange rate in t = 2. Finally, the term c(kB) is the opportunity cost
of banking and equals E(st )R∗kB, given a bank’s access to external capital
markets.
When a bank monitors its loan portfolio, its profit function is instead
given by
ΠB(e, l, r˜l) = F (e, r˜l,λ(st))l(st)− ϕ(l)−R(st)d(st)− E(st)R∗l∗(st)− c(kB)
(A2)
where F (e, r˜l,λ(st)) is the gross return on lending (exclusive of both loan
issuance and financing costs), which is calculated as follows:
F (e, r˜l,λ(st)) = 1 + α(e)λ(st)r˜l − β(e)(1− λ(st))− c(e)
The above calculation takes into account four elements: first, a monitoring
cost; second, a return of (1 + r˜l) associated with the proportion of “good”
firms (α(e)λ(st)) that were not shutdown; third, the capital recovered from
the proportion of firms that were shutdown, which equals 1 − α(e)λ(st) −
β(e)(1− λ(st)); and, fourth, a zero return due to the default of “bad” firms
that were erroneously allowed to initiate production. Note that the function
F (·) is concave due to the properties of banking technology. In subsequent
analysis, it will be useful to define the net return on lending (exclusive of
loan issuance costs only), i.e. F (e, r˜l,λ(st)) − E(st )R∗, which is subject to
the two following assumptions:
Assumption A1: For all effort levels, the net return on lending is pos-
itive in the first state and negative in the second, i.e.
F (e, r˜l,λ1) > E1R
∗
F (e, r˜l,λ2) < E2R∗
In other words, the combined effect of an exchange rate devaluation and of
a lower loan-repayment rate leads a bank to experience a loss in the second
state.
Assumption A2: For all effort levels, the expected net return on lending
is positive, i.e.
F (e, r˜l, λ¯) > E¯R∗
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The above assumption ensures that a bank’s expected profit is positive (even
when bailout guarantees do not exist).19 Finally, consider the economic intu-
ition underlying a bank’s decision regarding whether or not it should monitor.
A bank answers this question by comparing its expected profits under the
two alternative scenarios, which leads to the following definition:
Definition A1: Let λ denote a generic expected proportion of “good”
firms. A bank’s monitoring opportunity set is given by Φ(λ) = (0, eo(λ)),
where eo(λ) is uniquely given by
(1− β(eo))(1− λ)− (1− α(eo))λr˜l = c(eo)
The underlying reasoning is as follows: the left-hand side (LHS) is the
net benefit associated with monitoring. It is calculated as the proportion of
capital recovered from firms correctly identified as “bad” less the opportunity
cost associated with the early termination of “good” firms, which would
otherwise have yielded an additional return of λr˜l. A bank monitors its loan
portfolio if the gains are at least as great as its monitoring costs, which appear
on the right-hand side (RHS). The effort level at which a bank is indifferent
between monitoring or not monitoring is denoted by eo(λ).
8.1.3 Banking Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 1: Given a bank’s risk-neutral preferences, its mo-
mentary utility function is linear in consumption so that function (4) becomes
V = δ
X
st
π(st|s1)ΠB(e, l, r˜l, st)
upon the substitution of the budget constraint. The optimisation problem’s
FOC are then given by
δ
X
st
π(st|s1)Fe(e, r˜l,λ(st))l = 0 (A3)
δ
X
st
π(st|s1)[F (e, r˜l,λ(st))−E(st)R∗ − ϕl(l)] = 0 (A4)
which can be rewritten as
(1− q)Fe(e, r˜l,λ1)l + qFe(e, r˜l,λ2)l = 0 (A3’)
(1− q)F (e, r˜l,λ1) + qF (e, r˜l,λ2)− E¯R∗ − ϕl(l) = 0 (A4’)
19In this case, a bank faces an expected loan repayment rate of λ¯ = (1− q)λ1+ qλ2 and
an expected exchange rate of E¯ = (1− q)E1 + qE2.
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Equation (A4’) establishes that the optimal level of lending is positive when
evaluated at the optimal monitoring effort level due to assumption A2. In
turn, this implies that (A3’) is only satisfied when Fe(e, r˜l, λ¯) = 0, as q > 0.20
Equations (10) and (11) follow immediately from the definition of F (e, r˜l, λ¯)
while (12) is simply the market equilibrium condition of zero excess demand.
The second-order conditions, namely
Fee(e, r˜
l, λ¯) ≤ 0
−ϕll(l) ≤ 0
are also satisfied given the assumptions regarding banking technology and
loan issuance costs.
Proof of Proposition 2: In conjunction with assumption A1, the reason-
ing used in the previous proposition’s proof establishes the results obtained
here. Note that the FOC under bailout guarantees are given by
(1− q)Fe(e, r˜l,λ1)l = 0 (A5)
(1− q){F (e, r˜l,λ1)−E1R∗ − ϕl(l)} = 0 (A6)
which are only satisfied if F (e, r˜l,λ1)−E1R∗−ϕl(l) = 0 and Fe(e, r˜l,λ1) = 0
as q > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3 A casual inspection of the bankers’ optimal so-
lution under the two bailout regimes, vis. equations (10)-(12) and (15)-(17),
reveals that these are specific instances of a more general system of equations:
H1 ≡ F (eˆ, r˜l,λ)− ER∗ − ϕl(l) = 0
H2 ≡ α0(eˆ)λr˜l − β0(eˆ)(1− λ)− c0(eˆ) = 0
H3 ≡
Z
z∈Z
lˆ −D(rl) = 0
where λ and E denote a generic loan repayment and exchange rate respec-
tively. Note that the conditions of the implicit function theorem are satisfied
for the above system, as all partial derivatives exist (by assumption) and as
the Jacobian is non-zero when evaluated at the point of equilibrium:
|J | =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ H
1
l H
1
e H
1
rl
H2l H
2
e H
2
rl
H3l H
3
e H
3
rl
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ −ϕll(lˆ) 0 α(eˆ)λ0 Fee(eˆ, r˜l,λ) α0(eˆ)λ
1 0 −∂D(r
l)
∂rl
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ > 0
20The expected value of Fe(·) is equal to the value of Fe(·) when evaluated at the
expected loan repayment rate (λ¯). This property is due to the functional form of banking
technolgy and the fact that λ(st) is the only variable subject to stochastic uncertainty.
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where H2e = α
00(eˆ)λr˜l − β00(eˆ)(1 − λ) − c00(eˆ) < 0. Using Cramer’s rule, the
effect of a change in the loan repayment rate on the optimal monitoring is
deˆ
dλ
=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ H
1
l −H1λ H1rl
H2l −H2λ H2rl
H3l −H3λ H3rl
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
|J | < 0
since H1λ = α(eˆ)r˜
l + β(eˆ) > 0, H2λ = α
0(eˆ)r˜l + β0(eˆ) < 0 and H3λ = 0.
21
Similarly, it can be shown that
dlˆ
dλ
=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ −H
1
λ H
1
e H
1
rl
−H2λ H2e H2rl
−H3λ H3e H3rl
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
|J | > 0
drl
dλ
=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ H
1
l H
1
e −H1λ
H2l H
2
e −H2λ
H3l H
3
e −H3λ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
|J | < 0
which means that deˆ
drl
= −H
1
rl
H1e
> 0 for a given loan repayment rate. More-
over, optimal lending decreases when z(st) increases as dlˆ
dr˜l
> 0 for a given
monitoring level.
8.2 Taxation
8.2.1 Workers’ Optimisation Problem
A worker maximises (1) subject to constraints (2) and (3), taking the labour
tax-rate as given parametrically. For any given set of expected government
policy variables, the result of the worker’s problem is the consumption func-
tion for each period and the second period’s labour supply function. The
21The sign of H2λ is due the properties of banking technology and because r˜
l ∈ (0, 1).
In particular, recall that α0(e) ≥ 0, β0(e) ≤ 0 and ∂ Pr(A)∂e ≤ 0. These assumptions imply
that 0 < α0(eˆ)λ ≤ −β0(eˆ)(1− λ) < −β0(eˆ), or alternatively β0(eˆ) < α0(eˆ)λ+ β0(eˆ) < 0
whenever ∀λ ∈ (0, 1).
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FOC are given by the following Euler equations
cW1 (s
t) :
X
st
π(st|s1){uc(cW1 (st))− ν} = 0 (A7)
cW2 (s
t) :
X
st
π(st|s1){δ(uc(cW2 (st), 1− n(st))− νR−1(st)} = 0 (A8)
n(st) :
X
st
π(st|s1){νR−1(st)w˜(st)− δun(cW2 (st), 1− n(st))} = 0 (A9)
and have the usual interpretations. The Lagragean multiplier of the worker’s
lifetime budget constraint is denoted by ν.
8.2.2 Government’s Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem is solved using the dual approach in which tax-rates
are viewed as the decision variables. Since the Lagragean formulation (19)
already incorporates the firms’ FOC and the equilibrium factor market out-
comes, the government simply chooses the level of cW1 (s
t), cW2 (s
t), cB2 (s
t), n(st)
and k(st) that maximises its objective function. In the case of labour and
capital, the respective FOC are as follows:
n(st) :
X
st
π(st|s1)[−θδun(cW2 (st), 1− n(st)) + µ2R−1(st)w(st)
+µ1R
−1(st)(Qn(s
t)− w˜(st) + η2δunn(·, ·)] = 0 (A10)
k(st) :
X
st
π(st|s1)R−1(st){µ1(Qk − r˜l −Bk((st))
+µ2[F (e, r
l,λ(st))−E(st)R∗ − ϕk(k(st))]− η3} = 0 (A11)
as ucn(·, ·) = 0 and Fe(·, ·, ·) = 0 due to utility function separability and
equilibrium monitoring behaviour respectively while ϕkk(·) = 1.
8.3 Financial Supervision
8.3.1 Capital-Requirement Design
Using profit function (A2), note that l(st) are a bank’s assets, d(st) and l∗(st)
its domestic and foreign liabilities respectively, and kB its own capital. In
conjunction with the accounting identity, l(st) = kb + d(st)+ l∗(st), and the
equilibrium condition w.r.t. to financing costs, i.e. E(st)R∗ = R(st), banking
profits can be rewritten as
ΠB(e, l, r˜l, st) = (F (e, r˜l,λ(st))− E(st)R∗)l(st)− ϕ(l) +E(st)R∗kB − c(kB)
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where the return on assets per unit loan (net of financing costs only) is given
by F (e, r˜l, st) − E(st)R∗. Consider now the case of no bailouts: a bank’s
problem is to choose e ∈ Φ(λ¯) that maximises
V = (1− q){(F (e, r˜l,λ1)−E1R∗)l − ϕ(l)}+ q{(F (e, r˜l,λ2)−E2R∗)l − ϕ(l)}
(A12)
subject to constraints (5) and (6). Objective function (A12) is derived by
taking into account the fact that a household which invests kB in banking
could alternatively have invested it in an international asset yielding E¯R∗kB.
Hence, c(kB) is equal to E¯R∗kB in equilibrium.
In the case of bailout guarantees, however, a bank receives E1R∗kB in
the first state and nothing in the second. The equilibrium condition here is
(1− q)c(kB(e˜)) = E¯R∗kB(e˜) so that
V = (1− q){(F (e˜, r˜l,λ1)−E1R∗)l − ϕ(l) +E1R∗kB(e˜)− c(kB(e˜))}
= (1− q){(F (e˜, r˜l,λ1)−E1R∗)l − ϕ(l)}− qE2R∗kB(e˜) (A13)
on the assumption that a capital-requirement is in place. The latter’s design
must take into account a bank’s response to it, which the regulator achieves
by considering the nature of monitoring under (A12) and (A13). The respec-
tive FOC are as follows:µ
(1− q)∂F (e, r˜
l,λ1 )
∂e
+ q
∂F (e, r˜l,λ2 )
∂e
¶
l = 0 (A14)µ
(1− q)∂F (e, r˜
l,λ1 )
∂e
− qE2R∗
∂kB(e˜)
∂e˜
∂e˜
∂e
¶
l = 0 (A14’)
After comparing (A14) and (A14’), it is obvious that monitoring effort will
only be the same in both cases if
−qE2R∗
∂kB(e˜)
∂e˜
∂e˜
∂e
= q
∂F (e, r˜l,λ2 )
∂e
In practice, however, the enforceability of the capital requirement depends
on the regulator’s imperfect perception of a bank’s monitoring level, which
implies that22
∂kB(e˜)
∂e
= − 1
E2R∗
∂F (e˜, r˜l,λ2 )
∂e
≶ 0 (A15)
22i.e. −qE2R∗ ∂k
B(e˜)
∂e˜
∂e˜
∂e = q
∂F (e˜,r˜l,λ2 )
∂e˜
∂e˜
∂e . The respective monitoring levels are identical
only when γ = 1. As this is not the case, the regulator will never be able to ensure that a
bank pursues eˆs.
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Let eˆcr denote a bank’s monitoring level when a capital requirement is in
force. Note that ∂k
B(e˜)
∂e |e=eˆcr ≤ 0 necessarily implies that ∂F (e˜,r˜
l,λ1 )
∂eˆcr |e=eˆcr ≤ 0
in (A14’), or equivalently that eˆcr ≥ eˆp due to the properties of F (e, r˜l,λ1).
In other words, an increase in monitoring lowers the capital requirement,
which is clearly desirable both for the bank and for the regulator.23 This
observation implies that a capital-requirement must be designed with the
restriction ∂F (e˜,r˜
l
cr,λ2 )
∂e > 0 in mind so as to ensure that
∂kB(e˜)
∂e < 0. After
integrating (A15), it is easy to show that the restriction is given by
C + F (e˜, r˜lcr,λ2 ) > 0
where C is a constant chosen by the regulator. Subject to this restriction,
the enforceable capital requirement is defined as
kBcr(e˜) =
ϕ(l) + (E2R∗ − F (e˜, r˜l,λ2))l
E2R∗
(A16)
Finally, it can be shown after further manipulation that there exists an upper
limit for the capital requirement,
0 < kBcr(e˜) <
ϕ(l) + (E2R∗ + C)l
E2R∗
which is only binding when the bank has a negative incentive to pursue a
lower level of monitoring, i.e. when ∀e ∈ (0, eˆp).
8.3.2 Proof of Proposition 7
Let H denote FOC (A11), which implicitly defines the optimal capital tax-
rate. In equilibrium, the tax-rate will depend directly on monitoring level in
the following manner: dz
de
= −He
Hz
< 0 since
He =
X
st
π(st|s1)R−1(st){−µ1Bke((st)) + µ2[α0(eˆ)λ(st)(rl(st)− r˜l(st))]} > 0
Hz =
X
st
π(st|s1)R−1(st){µ1 + µ2(st)α(eˆ)λ(st)}rl > 0
Note that Bke(st) = −Fe(eˆ, r˜l,λ(st)) is non-positive ∀eˆ ∈ [eˆp(λ1, r˜l), eˆs(λ¯, r˜l)]
in the second state, given the paper’s assumptions.
23 On the other hand, when ∂k
B(e˜)
∂e |e=eˆcr ≥ 0, it is true that ∂F (e˜,r˜
l,λ1 )
∂eˆcr |e=eˆcr ≥ 0,
or equivalently that eˆcr ≤ eˆp . Here, there is a perverse incentive for a bank to reduce
monitoring.
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Sequence of Events
Date 1
Announcement Stage
Government commits itself to a fiscal policy.
Banking regulator announces the regulatory regime.
Banks’ Lending Game
Banking competition sets lending and borrowing rates.
Firms apply for loans and lending takes place.
Hidden Information
Nature reveals to firms their likelihood of a successful capital
set-up process.
Banks’ Monitoring Game
Banks decide monitoring levels.
Decision regarding loan recalls made.
Regulation Stage
Finanacial supervision takes place.
Date 2
Exogenous Regime Shock
Exchange rate and loan performance regime observed.
Borrowing and lending contracts are executed.
Production takes place.
Government expenditure plans implemented.
Figure 1
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Moral Hazard
Figure 2
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